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Summary
In the populous South Asian region where pump
irrigation, mostly from open wells and tubewells,
predominates gravity-flow irrigation, the fortunes
of groundwater and energy economies are
closely tied. New paradigms in water resource
management, which advocate pursuit of basin-
level water productivity in favor of classical water
use efficiency, tend to treat the energy costs of
irrigation as insignificant relative to the social
cost of water. But South Asia uses energy worth
US$3.78 billion per year to pump approximately
210 km3 of water, mostly for irrigation. Classical
efficiency would be difficult to dislodge here
because it optimizes water use as well as
energy use concurrently, whereas the notion of
basin-level water productivity ensures optimal
water-sector outcomes but sub-optimal
energy-sector outcomes.
In this region, little can be done to improve
the groundwater economy without affecting the
energy economy. The struggle to make the
energy economy viable is frustrated by the
farming community’s often-violent opposition to
efforts to rationalize energy prices. As a result,
the region’s groundwater economy has boomed
by bleeding the energy economy. This report
suggests that this does not have to be so. The
first step to evolving approaches to sustaining a
prosperous groundwater economy with a viable
power sector is for the decision makers in the
two sectors to talk to each other, and jointly
explore superior options for the co-management
of the groundwater and energy economies,
which we suggest have so far been overlooked.
In co-managing the two economies, the most
important aspect is the formulation of
appropriate policies for the pricing and supply of
power to pump irrigators. During the past three
decades, power industry managers as well as
international players, especially the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank, have insisted
that flat tariff charged to irrigators, based on the
capacity of the pump rather than the metered
consumption of power, is the key reason for
power industry losses, and they have advocated
a transition to a metered power supply regime.
We suggest that doing so may not help unless
the power industry addresses the formidable
logistical problems of supplying metered power
to more than 13 million scattered, small users.
In India, during the 1970s, these problems
forced the power industry to abandon metered
power supply in favor of a flat tariff for power
supplied for irrigation. On the other hand, we
suggest that what has been so far passed off as
a flat tariff is a degenerate pricing policy. Zero
tariff for power, as levied in the Indian states of
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, is
not a flat tariff. A flat tariff without proactive
rationing of the power supply cannot achieve a
balance between satisfying irrigation needs and
keeping the power sector viable. Levied as a tax
rather than as a price, a scientific flat tariff for
the power supply to pump irrigation can be a
logical and viable alternative in a situation where
the transaction costs of metering and metered
charge collection are exceedingly high, as the
power sector in Pakistan discovered after it
reverted to metering in 2000.
We explore the metered tariff and flat tariff
regimes not just as alternative pricing policies
but as alternate business philosophies. In the
first, the electricity industry charges an economic
price and in return offers the best service by
providing quality power on demand; in the
second, the power industry saves on massive
transaction costs by using a flat tariff
accompanied by the sophisticated management
of a high quality but carefully rationed power
supply.  We argue that while the first represents
the long term goal, the second has the potential
to help improve at once the financial
sustainability of energy use in agriculture and the
environmental sustainability of groundwatervi
irrigation in a region where depletion and
deterioration of this resource can spell doom for
farming and livelihoods.
The report suggests that the inability to
manage groundwater and energy economies as
a nexus is a great opportunity missed in moving
towards sustainable groundwater management.
In South Asia, there seems to be no practical
means for the direct management of
groundwater. Laws are unlikely to check the
chaotic race to extract groundwater because of
the logistical problems of regulating a large
number of small, dispersed users. Water pricing
and property-right reforms also will not work for
the same reasons.  Appropriate policies for the
supply and pricing of power offer a powerful
toolkit for the indirect management of both
groundwater and energy use.
We conclude that the metering of the farm
power supply to 13-14 million electric tubewells
in the South Asian region—the solution most
widely espoused—poses a formidable logistical
challenge as well as mass-based farmer
opposition, which would make it politically difficult
to implement. Even if it is accepted, the
logistical problems and high transaction costs of
metering and billing a large number of dispersed
farm power connections continue to remain on a
far larger scale today. If metering is to be
introduced, its chances of working depend
critically on the institutional innovations in
metering and billing at the feeder level or below,
as has happened in China. However, in the short
run, the best course of action is to transform the
existing degenerate system of flat tariff into a
rational flat tariff. This involves, first, raising flat
tariffs moderately and regularly rather than in big
jumps, and second, implementing a proactive
power supply policy for the farm sector.
The proactive power supply policy should cap
the total duration of power supply over the entire
year to a level viable relative to the level of flat
tariff, and then schedule the power supply to fit
farmers’ irrigation needs as best as possible. This
can be done in several ways. We outline a
sample of five illustrative approaches: (i)
agronomic scheduling, (ii) demand-based
scheduling, (iii) canal-based scheduling, (iv) zonal
roster, and (v) adjusted zonal roster. Pursuing this
strategy of proactive management of a rationed
power supply can reduce power industry losses
from its farm operations, reduce overall technical
and commercial losses of power, curtail wasteful
use of an estimated 12-21 km3 of groundwater
per year, and improve farmer satisfaction with
the power industry.1
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Introduction
Groundwater irrigation has come to be the
mainstay of irrigated agriculture in much of India,
the Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan, the
Terai region of Nepal, and Bangladesh. Farmers
in this populous South Asian region use more
than 21 million pumps, about half of them
powered by heavily subsidized electricity, to
irrigate their fields and the energy sector’s stake
in agriculture has risen sharply. Agricultural use
of electricity accounts for 15-20 percent of the
power consumption and the pricing of power to
agriculture is a hot political issue. State power
utilities have been at loggerheads with the
region’s groundwater economy for over 15 years.
In the 1950s, when raising energy
consumption was considered synonymous with
economic progress, government-owned state
power utilities aggressively persuaded unwilling
farmers to install electric tubewells. In Indian
states like Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, the Chief
Ministers set steep targets to district-level
officials to sell electricity connections to farmers.
Loans and concessions were made available to
farmers to popularize tubewell irrigation. During
the 1960s and the 1970s, the World Bank
supported huge investments in rural
electrification infrastructure to stimulate
groundwater irrigation and agricultural growth.
These policies were vindicated when the green
revolution was found to follow the tubewell
revolution, lagging 3-5 years behind it, and
researchers like Robert Repetto (1994) asserted
that “the Green Revolution is more tubewell
revolution than wheat revolution.”  By the 1970s,
the energy-irrigation nexus had already become
a prominent feature of the region’s agrarian
boom; even in canal commands, for example in
Indian and Pakistan Punjab, groundwater
irrigation had grown rapidly.
However, soon, the enthusiasm of state
power utilities towards their agricultural
customers began to wane. In India, State
Electricity Boards (SEBs) were charging tubewell
owners based on the metered consumption, but,
as the number of tubewells increased, the SEBs
found it costly and difficult to manage metering
and billing. The cost of meters and their
maintenance was the least worry. The
transaction costs of the farm power supply—in
terms of the costs of containing rampant
tampering of meters, under-billing and corruption
at the level of meter readers, and of maintaining
an army of meter readers, and increasing
pilferage of power—were far bigger and difficult
to control. The introduction of a flat tariff based
on the horse-power rating of the pump, in state
after state during the 1970s and 1980s, was a
response to these high and rising transaction
costs of metered power supply. While the flat
tariff eliminated the hassle and cost of metering
it still allowed malpractices such as under-
reporting of the horse-power rating, but
controlling this was easier than controlling
pilferage under the metered tariff system. Flat
tariffs however became “sticky.” As the power
supply to agriculture emerged as a major driver
of irrigated agriculture, politicians found its
pricing a powerful weapon in populist vote-bank
politics. Unable to increase the flat tariff for
years on end and under pressure to supply
abundant power to farms, power utilities began
to find their balance sheets turning red, and the
industry as well as its protagonists and
multilateral donors veered around to the view2
that reverting to a metered tariff for the farm
power supply is a precondition to restoring the
viability of the power industry. This view, based
on the neo-classical economic theory, considered
only the “transformation cost” of generating and
distributing power and overlooked the
“transaction costs” of unit pricing of the power
supply to farmers.
In this report, our objective is to reevaluate
the entire debate by putting it in the perspective
of the new institutional economics, which shows
how some activities that we all know have high
payoffs in terms of productivity fail to get
undertaken because of the presence of
transaction costs that neo-classical economics
ignores (North 1997). We begin with the premise
that electricity pricing and supply policies in South
Asia are closely linked with the policy goals of
managing groundwater irrigation for efficiency,
equity and sustainability. Analyzing the energy
and groundwater economies as a nexus could
help evolve joint strategies that can help South
Asia conserve its groundwater while at the same
time improving the viability of its power industry.
Energy-Irrigation Nexus
The energy-irrigation nexus focuses attention on
a class of issues that are unique to the South
Asian region as well as the North China Plain.
Many countries—for example, the USA, Iran and
Mexico—make intensive use of groundwater in
their agriculture sectors. However, in these
countries, groundwater irrigation affects only a
small proportion of their people; energy use by
agriculture is a small proportion of their total
energy use and the cost of energy use in
farming is a small proportion of the total value-
added in farming.
India is the biggest groundwater user in the
world (figure 1). In South Asia, in addition to
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal are the
major groundwater users. Good data on the
groundwater-irrigated area, groundwater draft
and the number of mechanized irrigation wells in
operation are hard to come by. However, our
estimate is that between them these four
countries pump about 210-250 km
3 of
groundwater every year. In doing so, they use
about 21-23 million pumps, of which about 13-14
million are electric and around 8-9 million are
powered by diesel engines (NSSO 1999, for
India). If we assume that an average electric
tubewell (with a pumping efficiency of 25%) lifts
water to an average head of 30 meters, the total
energy used in these countries for lifting 210
km
3 of groundwater is about 68.6 billion kWh
equivalent per year.
1 At an alternative cost of
US$0.05 (Indian Rs 2.5) per kWh,
2 supplying
this energy costs the region’s energy industry
US$3.78 billion.
3 The market value of the
1According to Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, electricity use in Indian agriculture in 2000-2001 is 84.7 billion kWh, much greater than
our estimate of 68.6 billion kWh of total energy use (by electric and diesel pumpsets) per year by tubewells for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Nepal, where at least one-third of the tubewells are run by diesel pumps. However, we also know that the estimates of agricultural
electricity use in India are overestimates (see footnote 7) and include a portion of transmission and distribution losses in non-farm sectors
that are passed off as agricultural consumption (CMIE 2003).
2US$1.00 = Indian Rs 46.00 = Pakistan Rs 60.20 = Bangladeshi Taka 60.90 = Nepalese Rs 74.50 (July 2004).
3Gulati and Narayanan (2003) took the difference between the total cost of supplying power to all sectors and the tariff charged from the
agriculture sector as a measure of the subsidy to agriculture per kWh. Multiplying this by the estimated power supply to agriculture, they
place the power subsidy to agriculture in 2000-2001 at US$6.26 billion (Indian Rs 288.14 billion) and suggest that this is 78 times more than
what it was in 1980-1981. But they acknowledge that their estimate is likely to be a huge overestimate because of the propensity of SEBs to
pass off excessive transmission and distribution (T&D) losses in other sectors as farm consumption.3
4We assumed that an average South Asian tubewell uses 4 kWh of energy per hour, the equivalent of the energy used by a 5 hp pump in
pumping for an hour, which gives us 17.15 billion hours of pumping of groundwater per year. At an average price of US$0.65 per hour, the
computed market value of pump irrigation in the region is US$11.34 billion. In many parts of South Asia, water sellers providing a pump
irrigation service claim a one-third crop share. Based on this, we computed the contribution to farm output as 3 times the market value of
pump irrigation. Alternatively, according to our calculations, a representative South Asian tubewell produces about US$543.48 worth irrigation
water per year, which helps to produce crops worth US$1,630.44. If we take the World Bank estimate, which places the groundwater contri-
bution to India’s GDP at 10%, our calculations are severe underestimates of the productive contribution of tubewell irrigation.
5Dhawan estimated the net value of the marginal product of power in agriculture as US$0.20 per kWh in net terms and US$0.30 per kWh in
terms of gross value of output (Dhawan 1999).
irrigation produced is US$9.8-12.0 billion
4 and its
contribution to agricultural output is likely of the
order of US$29.3-35.9 billion.
5 In these emerging
low-income economies, pump irrigation is serious
business with economy-wide impacts, both
positive and negative.
Unlike in other groundwater using countries,
the pump irrigation economy in South Asia
affects vast numbers of low-income households
and large proportions of rural populations. The
growth in groundwater irrigation in the region is
relatively recent (figure 2). In India, gravity
FIGURE 2.
Irrigated area by source, India.
Source: GOI 1999.
FIGURE 1.
Groundwater use per year in selected countries during the 1980s.
Source: Llamas et al. 1992.4
systems dominated irrigated agriculture until the
1970s, but by the early 1990s groundwater
irrigation had far surpassed surface irrigation in
terms of the area served as well as the
proportion of agricultural output supported
(Debroy and Shah 2003; Shah et al. 2003).
According to Government of India estimates, 60
percent of India’s irrigated lands is served by
groundwater wells (GOI n.d.; GOI 2001).
However, independent surveys suggest that the
proportion may be more like 75 percent (Shah et
al. 2004b; NSSO 1999).
In  1999-2000, India’s 81 million land owning
families (http://labourbureau.nic.in/) had an
estimated 20 million tubewells and pumpsets
among them. On average, every fourth
landowning household has a pumpset and a well
and a large proportion of non-owners depend on
pumpset owners for their irrigation water,
supplied through local, fragmented groundwater
markets (Shah 1993). According to a World
Bank estimate, groundwater irrigation contributes
to about 10 percent of India’s GDP (World Bank
and GOI 1998). This is possible because
groundwater irrigation uses about 15-20 percent
of the total electricity consumed in the country.
The large number of small pump users is a
peculiarity of the South Asian region. In
countries like the USA, Iran and Mexico, which
have large groundwater irrigation economies,
tubewells are fewer and larger and a typical
tubewell irrigates an area 10-500 times larger
than the area irrigated by a typical tubewell in
India, Bangladesh or Nepal. In Mexico’s
Guanajuato province, the heartland of its
intensive groundwater irrigated agriculture, a
typical tubewell is run by a 100-150 horsepower
pump and operates for over 4,000 hours in a
year (Scott et al. 2002). In India, Bangladesh
and Nepal, the modal pump size is 6.5 hp and
the average duration of operation is 400-500
hours per year (Shah 1993). In Iran, only
365,000 tubewells are used to pump 29 km
3 of
groundwater per year (Hekmat 2002) while India
uses 38 times more wells, compared to Iran, to
extract five times more groundwater.
From the viewpoint of managing
groundwater as well as the transaction costs of
the energy supply to irrigation, these
differences are crucial. Having to deal with a
relatively small number of fairly large irrigators
is one of the factors that has helped countries
like Iran and Mexico to manage groundwater
irrigation. In Iran, when groundwater overdraft
in the hinterland threatened the water supply to
cities in the plains, the Ministry of Power (which
also manages water resources) was able to
enforce a complete ban (provided under its
Water Law) on new groundwater structures
coming up in two-fifths of the plains (Hekmat
2002). In Mexico, the Commission National de
Aqua has endeavored to establish and enforce
a system of water rights in the form of
concessions and initiate a program to create
groundwater user organizations to promote
sustainable resource management. While this
has helped to register most of its 90,000
tubewell owners, Mexico is finding it difficult to
limit pumping to the quotas assigned to them
(Scott et al. 2002).
An important aspect in groundwater
management is the relation between
groundwater irrigation and food security and
livelihoods. In countries with shrinking
agriculture, the proportion of people dependent
on groundwater-irrigated agriculture tends to be
small (see table 1, last column). This, for
example, is the case in the USA, Mexico and
Iran. One would have normally thought that in
such situations, it would be easier for
governments to adopt a tough posture with
irrigators, especially if serious environmental
anomalies are involved. However, we find that
this is not so. Mexico has been unable to
remove substantial energy subsidies to
agriculture or rein in groundwater depletion
(Scott et al. 2002) and the USA has found it
possible to only restrict the rate of, but not quite
stop, the mining of the great Ogallala aquifer.
Even after imposing a ban, Iran is still struggling
to eliminate its annual groundwater overdraft of
5 km
3 (Hekmat 2002). In South Asia, the
dependence on groundwater is far greater, not
for wealth creation as much as to support the
livelihoods of millions of rural, poor households.
In India, for instance, pump irrigation has
emerged as the backbone of its agriculture and
accounts for 70-80 percent of the value of
irrigated farm output. Rapid groundwater
development is at the heart of the agrarian5
dynamism found in some areas in eastern India
where agriculture remained stagnant for a long
time (Sharma and Mehta 2002). The greatest
social value of groundwater irrigation is that it
has helped to make famines a thing of the past.
During 1963-66, a small deficit in rainfall left
reservoirs empty and sent food production
plummeting by 19 percent; but during the 1987-
88 drought, when the rainfall deficit was 19
percent, food production fell by only 2 percent,
thanks to widespread groundwater irrigation
(Sharma and Mehta 2002).
It is often argued that with 60 million tons
of food stocks, India can now assume a tough
posture on groundwater abuse. However, this
view misses an important point; contribution of
groundwater to farm incomes and rural
livelihoods is far more crucial than its
contribution to food security, especially outside
canal commands.
6  In South Asia, the
proportion of the total population that is directly
or indirectly dependent on groundwater
irrigation for farm-based livelihoods is many
times larger than that of Iran and Mexico.
Indeed, our surmise is that at least three-
fourths of the rural population and over half of
the total population of India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Nepal depend, directly or
indirectly, on groundwater irrigation for their
livelihoods. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the energy-irrigation nexus has been at the
center of vote-bank politics in the region.
6Dhawan (cited in Samra 2002), for instance, has asserted that in low rainfall regions of India, “a wholly [groundwater] irrigated acre of land
becomes equivalent to 8 to 10 acres of dry land in terms of production and income” (emphasis added).
TABLE 1.
Groundwater usage, number of pumps used and extraction rate, and dependence on groundwater in
different countries.
Country/province Annual groundwater No. of pumps Extraction per Population (%)
usage (km3) (million) pump (m3/year) dependent on
groundwater
Pakistan Punjab 45 0.5 90,000 60-65
India 150 21.28 7,900 55-60
China 75 3.5 21,500 22-25
Iran 29 0.5 58,000 12-18
Mexico 29 0.07 414,285 5-6
USA 100 0.2 500,000 <1-2
Sources: Hekmat 2002 for Iran; Mukherji and Shah 2002 for India; Scott et al. 2002 for Mexico; and Shah et al. 2002 for China and Pakistan.6
Sectoral Policy Perspectives
Management of the Groundwater
Economy
Groundwater policymakers face conflicting
challenges in managing this chaotic economy in
different areas of South Asia. Agrarian growth in
the region, particularly after 1970, has been
sustained primarily by private investments in
pump irrigation. However, the development of
the resource has been highly uneven. In the
groundwater-abundant Ganga-Brahmaputra-
Meghana basin—home to 400 million of the
world’s rural poor in Bangladesh, the Nepal Terai
and eastern India—groundwater development
can produce stupendous livelihood and
ecological benefits (Shah 2001). However, it is
precisely here that development is slow and
halting. In contrast, Pakistan Punjab, Indian
Punjab, Haryana and all of peninsular India are
rapidly overdeveloping their groundwater
resources and it has reached a stage where
agriculture in these areas faces a serious threat
from resource depletion and degradation. The
priority here is to find ways of restricting
groundwater use to make it socially and
environmentally sustainable.
In stimulating or regulating groundwater use,
as appropriate, the tools available to resource
managers are few and inadequate. Regulating
groundwater draft and protecting the resource is
proving far more complex and difficult. Direct
management of an economy with such a vast
number of small players would be a Herculean
task in most circumstances. In South Asia, it is
even more so because the groundwater
bureaucracies are small, ill equipped and
outmoded. For instance, India’s Central Ground
Water Board, which was created during the
1950s to monitor groundwater resources, has no
field force nor operational experience and
capability in managing groundwater. Direct
management of the groundwater economy will,
therefore, remain an impractical idea for a long
time in South Asia.
This makes indirect management relevant
and appealing; and electricity supply and pricing
policies offer a potent tool kit for indirect
management provided these are used as such.
Regrettably, these have so far not been used
with imagination and thoughtfulness. In the
groundwater-abundant Ganga basin, the
favorable power supply environment can
stimulate livelihood creation for the poor through
accelerated groundwater development. But, as
described later in this report, this region has
been very nearly de-electrified (Shah 2001).
Elsewhere, there is a dire need to restrict
groundwater draft as abundant power supply and
perverse subsidies are accelerating the depletion
of the resource. All in all, power supply and
pricing policies in the region have so far been an
outstanding case of perverse targeting. A major
reason for this is the lack of dialogue between
the two sectors, energy and groundwater
irrigation, and their pursuit of sectoral optima
rather than managing the nexus.
Charging for Power to Agriculture: Flat
Tariff or Metered Tariff?
The groundwater economy is an anathema to
the power industry in the region. Agricultural use
of power accounts for 15-20 percent of the total
power consumption and power pricing to
agriculture is a hot political issue. In India, the
power supply to agriculture is free in states like
Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra
while in other states, farmers pay a heavily
subsidized flat electricity tariff, which is based on
the horse-power rating of the pump rather than
the actual consumption. Annual losses to Indian
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) on account of
power subsidies to agriculture are estimated at
US$5.65 billion (Indian Rs 260 billion) and these
losses are growing at a compound annual
growth rate of 26 percent per year (Lim 2001;
Gulati 2002). If these estimates are to be
believed, it will not be long before power industry
finances are completely in the red.  However,
these estimates have been widely contested. It
has been shown that SEBs have been
misassigning their growing transmission and
distribution (T&D) losses in the domestic and7
industrial sectors as agricultural consumption,
which is unmetered and so unverifiable.
7
However, the fact remains that the agricultural
power supply under the existing regime is the
prime cause of the bankruptcy of SEBs in India.
As a result, there is a growing movement
now favoring a reversion to the metered power
supply and pricing system. The power industry
has been leading this movement, and
international agencies—particularly, the World
Bank, the United States Agency for International
Development and the Asian Development
Bank—have begun to insist on metered power
supply to agriculture as the key condition for
financing new power projects. The Central and
State Electricity Regulatory Commissions of
India have been setting deadlines for SEBs and
state governments to make a transition to
universal metering. The Government of India has
resolved to:
• provide power on demand by 2012,
• meter all consumers in two phases, with
phase I to cover metering of all 11 kVA
(kilovolt-ampere) feeders and high
tension consumers, and phase II to
cover all consumers, and
• carry out regular energy audits to assess
T&D losses and eliminate all power
thefts within 2 years (Godbole 2002).
This is an ambitious agenda indeed.
However, all moves towards metered power
consumption have met with farmer opposition on
an unprecedented scale in Andhra Pradesh,
Gujarat, Kerala and other states of India. Most
Indian states have been offering major
inducements to tubewell owners to opt for
metered connections. Until it announced free
power to farmers in June 2004, Andhra Pradesh
charged metered tubewells at only US cents 0.4-
0.7 per kWh, and Gujarat and several other
states only US cents 1.1-1.5 per kWh, compared
to the supply cost of US cents 5-8 per kWh. In a
recent move, the state government of Gujarat
has offered a drip irrigation system free to any
farmer who opts for metering.
Yet, there are few takers for metered
electricity connections. Instead, the demand for
free power to agriculture has gathered
momentum in many Indian states.
8  Farmers’
opposition to metered tariff has only partly to do
with the subsidy contained in flat tariff; they find
flat tariff more transparent and simple to
understand. It also spares them the tyranny of
the meter readers. Moreover, there are fears
that once under a metered tariff system, SEBs
will start imposing all manner of new charges
under different names. In addition, groundwater
irrigators raise the issue of equity with canal
irrigators, arguing that if the latter can be
provided irrigation at subsidized flat rates by
public irrigation systems, they too deserve the
same terms for groundwater irrigation.
In South Asia, the power industry persists in
the belief that its fortunes would not change until
agriculture is put back on a metered electricity
tariff regime.  Strong support to this view is lent
by those working in the groundwater sector
where it is widely, and rightly, held that zero and
flat power tariff produce strong perverse
incentives for farmers to indulge in profligate and
wasteful use of water as well as power because
it reduces the marginal cost of water extraction
to nearly zero. The preoccupation of water and
power sector professionals in aggressively
advocating reversion to a metered tariff regime
and of farmers to frustrate their design is, in our
view, detracting the region from transforming a
vicious energy-irrigation nexus into a virtuous
one in which a booming and better-managed,
groundwater-based agrarian economy can
coexist with a viable electricity industry.
7Shah (2001) has analyzed this aspect for the SEB of the Uttar Pradesh state of India and found that agricultural power use is 35 percent
lower than that claimed.  Similarly, based on a World Bank study in Haryana state, Kishore and Sharma (2002) report that the actual agricul-
tural power consumption is 27 percent less than that reported, and the overall T&D loss is 47 percent while the official claim is that it is 36.8
percent, making the SEB appear more efficient than it actually is. The power subsidy ostensibly meant for the agricultural sector but actually
accruing to other sectors is estimated at US$0.12 billion per year (Indian Rs.5.50 billion per year) for Haryana alone.
8And farmers are getting away with it in many states. The electricity supply to agriculture became a major issue in India’s 2004 parliamentary
and state elections. Chief Ministers of some states (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Tamilnadu) suffered major electoral reverses, arguably, on
account of the farmer opposition to their stand on the pricing of the electricity supply to agriculture. The new Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh
announced free power to farmers the day after he assumed office. The Chief Minister of Tamilnadu, who had abolished free power in the
state, restored it soon after the election. Gujarat’s Chief Minister softened his hard stand on farm power supply and in Maharashtra, the ruling
party has promised to provide free power to farmers if it comes to power.8
Making a Metered Tariff Regime Work
Arguments in favor of a metered tariff regime
are several. One is that it allows state power
utilities to manage their commercial losses; you
cannot manage what you do not monitor and
you cannot monitor what you do not measure.
Another is that once farm power is metered,
power utilities cannot use agricultural
consumption as a carpet under which they can
sweep their T&D losses in other sectors. It is
also argued that metering would give farmers
correct signals about the real cost of power and
water, and force them to economize on their
use. For reasons that are not entirely clear, it is
often suggested that compared to a flat tariff
regime, metered tariff would be less amenable to
political manipulation and easier to raise when
the cost of supplying power rises. Finally, flat
tariff is widely argued to be inequitable towards
small landowners and to irrigators, in regions
with limited groundwater availability.
The logic in support of metered tariff is
obvious and unexceptionable. The problem is
how to make a metered tariff regime work as
envisaged. Two issues seem critical. First is how
to deal with the relentless farmer opposition to
metering. The second issue is how will power
utilities now deal with the problems that forced
them to switch to a flat tariff during the 1970s in
the first place.
The extent of the farmer resistance to
metering is evident in the repeated failure of
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) in various states
of India to entice farmers to accept metering by
offering metered power at subsidized rates. The
subsidized rates range from US cents 0.4 to 1.3
per kWh as against the actual cost of supply of
US cent 5 to 8 per kWh. In late 2002, Batra and
Singh (2003) interviewed 188 pump owners in
Indian Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar
Pradesh to understand their pumping behavior.
They noted that in Indian Punjab as well as
Haryana, an average electric pump owner would
spend US$54.99 and US$147.94 less per year
on their total power bill if they accepted metering
at the prevailing rates of US cents 1.0 per kWh
and US cents 1.4 per kWh, respectively. Yet
they would not accept metering. In effect, this is
the price they are willing to pay to avoid the
hassle and costs of metering.
9
Transaction Costs of Metering
Besides dealing with mass farmer resistance,
protagonists of metering need also to consider
the numbers of electric tubewells and the
problems associated with metering them, which
are now 10 times larger than when a flat tariff
was first introduced. Before 1975, when all
SEBs charged for farm power on a metered
basis, logistical difficulties and transaction costs
of metering had become so high that a flat tariff
seemed to be the only way of containing it. A
1985 study by the Rural Electrification
Corporation estimated that the cost of metering
the rural power supply in Uttar Pradesh and
Maharashtra was 26 percent and 16 percent,
respectively, of the total revenue of the SEB
from the farm sector (Shah 1993). And this
estimate included only the direct costs, such as
cost of meter, cost of maintaining it, cost of the
power consumed by the meter, and the costs of
meter reading, billing and collection of payments.
These costs are not insignificant.
10 However, the
far bigger part of the transaction cost of
metering is the cost of containing pilferage,
tampering with meters, and underreading by
meter readers in connivance with farmers.
9According to Batra and Singh (2003), farmers resist metering because of the prevalence of irregularities in the SEBs. Frequent meter burn-
outs, which cost the farmer US$21.74 (Indian Rs 1,000) per meter, false billing, uncertainty about the accuracy of bills, etc. make farmers
reject metering. They suggest farmers also resist metering because of the two-part tariff (energy charge and rental for meter) system offered
as an alternative to flat tariff. They are reluctant to pay the rental charge, the “minimum bill,” which they have to pay even if they do not use
electricity in a given month.
10A recent World Bank study in the small Indian state of Haryana estimated that the cost of metering all farm power connections in the state
would amount to US$30 million (Indian Rs 1,380 million) in capital investment and US$2.2 million (Indian Rs 101.2 million) per year in operat-
ing costs (Kishore and Sharma 2002). The Maharashtra Electricity Tariff Commission estimated the capital cost of metering the state’s farm
connections at US$0.25 billion (Indian Rs 11.50 billion) (Godbole 2002).9
All in all, the power sector’s aggressive
advocacy of a metered tariff regime in
agriculture is based, in our view, on excessively
low estimates of the transaction costs of
metering, meter reading, billing and payment
collection from several hundred thousand electric
tubewell users scattered over a vast area
11 that
each power utility serves. Most Indian SEBs find
it difficult to manage a metered power supply
even in industrial and domestic sectors where
the transaction costs involved are bound to be
lower than those in the agriculture sector.  Even
where meters are installed, many SEBs are
unable to collect charges based on metered
consumption. In Uttar Pradesh, 40 percent of
the low-tension power consumers has metered
connections, but only 11 percent is billed on the
basis of metered use; the remainder is billed
based on a minimum charge or an average of
the past months of metered use (Kishore and
Sharma 2002). In Orissa, under far reaching
power sector reforms, private distribution
companies have brought all users under a
metered tariff regime. However, 100 percent
collection of amounts billed has worked only for
industries. In the domestic and farm sectors—
with a large number of scattered small users—
collection as a percentage of billing declined
from 90.5 percent in 1995/96 to 74.6 percent in
1999/2000 (Panda 2002).
Achieving Success: An Example from
North China
In order to make a metered tariff regime work
reasonably well, three things seem essential: (i)
the metering and collection agent must have the
requisite authority to deal with deviant behavior
among users; (ii) the agent should be subject to
a tight control system so that he can neither
behave arbitrarily with consumers
12 nor work in
collusion with them; and (iii) he must have
proper incentives to enforce the metered tariff
regime. A quick assessment by Shah (2003) of a
metered tariff regime in north China, where the
agrarian conditions are in some ways
comparable to South Asia, suggests that all the
above conditions are found there in some way,
and therefore, the metered tariff regime works
reasonably well in this area of north China (Shah
et al. 2004a).
The Chinese electricity supply industry
operates on two principles: (i) total cost recovery
in generation, transmission and distribution, at
each level, with some minor cross-subsidization
across user groups and areas; and (ii) each user
pays in proportion to his usage. Unlike in much
of India, where farmers pay for power either
nothing or much less than domestic and
industrial consumers, agricultural electricity use
in many parts of north China attracts the highest
charge per unit, followed by household users
and then industries. Operation and maintenance
of local power infrastructure is the responsibility
of local units, the Village Committee at the
village level, the Township Electricity Bureau at
the township level, and the County Electricity
Bureau at the county level. The responsibility of
collecting electricity charges also is vested in
local units in ways that ensures that the power
used at each level is paid for in full. At the
village level, this implies that the sum of power
use recorded in the meters attached to all
irrigation pumps has to tally with the power
supply recorded at the transformer for any given
period. The unit or person charged with the fee
collection responsibility has to pay the Township
Electricity Bureau for the power usage recorded
at the transformer level. In many areas, where
power supply infrastructure is old and worn out,
line losses below the transformer made this
difficult. To allow for normal line losses, a 10
percent allowance is given by the Township
Electricity Bureau to the village unit. However,
even this must have made it difficult for the
latter to tally the payments collected with the
units recorded at transformer level. As a result,
11Rao and Govindarajan (2003) lay particular emphasis on the geographic dispersion and remoteness of farm consumers in increasing the
transaction costs of metering and billing. For example, a rural area of the size of Bhubaneshwar, the capital of Orissa state, has approxi-
mately 4,000 consumers with an electricity charge collection potential of US$15,217 (Indian Rs 0.7 million) a month. Bhubaneshwar has
96,000 consumer with a collection potential of US$0.48 million (Indian Rs 22.0 million) a month.
12In states like Gujarat, which had a metered tariff regime until 1987, an important source of opposition to metering was the arbitrariness of
meter readers and the power they had come to wield over the farmers. In many villages, farmers organized themselves with the sole purpose
of resisting the tyranny of the meter reader. In some areas, this became so serious that meter readers were declared persona non grata.
Even today, electricity board field staff seldom go to villages, except in fairly large groups, and often with police escort.10
an Electricity Network Reform program was
undertaken by the national government to
modernize and rehabilitate rural power
infrastructure. Where this was done, line losses
fell sharply.
13 Among the nine villages Shah
visited in three counties of Hanan and Hebei
provinces in early 2002, none of the village
electricians he interviewed had a problem tallying
power consumption recorded at the transformer
level with the total consumption recorded by
individual users, especially with the line-loss
allowance of 10 percent (Shah et al. 2004a).
An important reason why this institutional
arrangement works is the strong local authority
structure in Chinese villages. The electrician is
respected because the Village Committee and
the powerful Party Leader at the village level
back him, and the new service orientation is
designed partly to project the electrician as a
friend of the people. The same Village
Committee and Party Leader can also check any
flagrantly arbitrary behavior of the electrician
with the users. The hypothesis that with better
quality power and support service, farmers
would be willing to pay a high price for power is
best exemplified in Hanan where at US cents
8.75 per kWh,
14 farmers pay a higher electricity
rate compared to most categories of users in
India and Pakistan.
In India, there has been some discussion
about the level of incentive needed to make
privatization of electricity retailing attractive at
the village level. A village electrician in Hanan or
Hebei is able to deliver on a fairly modest
reward of US$25.00 per month (Yuan 200 per
month, which is equivalent to half the value of
wheat produced on 1.0 mu or 0.067 hectare of
land). For this rather modest reward, the village
electrician undertakes to make good to the
Township Electricity Bureau the full value of line
and commercial losses in excess of 10 percent
of the power consumption recorded at the
transformers. If he can manage to keep losses
to less than 10 percent, he can keep 40 percent
of the value of power saved.
 All in all, the Chinese have all along had a
working solution to a problem that has befuddled
South Asia for nearly two decades. Following
Deng Xiaoping who famously asserted that “it
does not matter whether the cat is black or white,
as long as it catches mice,” the Chinese have
built an incentive-compatible system that delivers
quickly. They did not waste time on rural
electricity cooperatives and Village Electricity
Associations (Vidyut Sanghas) that are being tried
in India and Bangladesh. In the way the Chinese
collect metered electricity charges, it is well nigh
impossible for the power industry to lose money
in distribution since losses there are firmly passed
down from one level to the level below.
Can South Asia Emulate the Chinese
Model?
If South Asia is to change to a metered tariff
regime, the Chinese offer a good model. But
there are two problems. First is the low gross
value of agricultural output in most of South
Asia. Chinese agricultural productivity is so
much higher than that in most regions of South
Asia that even with power charged for at real
cost, the cost of tubewell irrigation constitutes a
relatively small proportion of the gross value of
output. In South Asia, irrigation costs in the
range of US$45.65 to 186.96 per hectare would
make groundwater irrigation unviable in all
regions except parts of Indian and Pakistan
Punjab and Haryana where farm productivity
approaches Chinese levels.
The second problem is that while South
Asian power industry can mimic, or even outdo,
the Chinese incentive system, it cannot replicate
the Chinese system of authority at the village
level. Absence of an effective local authority that
can ensure compliance to rules and regulations
and proper behavior by both farmers and
metering agents may create unforeseen
complications in adapting the Chinese model to
South Asia.
13A reward system for the village electrician encourages him to take action to achieve greater efficiency by cutting line losses.  In Dong Wang
nu village in Ci county, the Village Committee’s single large transformer that served both domestic and agricultural power connections caused
heavy line losses of 22-25 percent. Once the Network Reform Program began, the village electrician pressurized the Village Committee to
sell the old transformer to the Township Electricity Bureau and raise US$1,250 (Yuan 10,000), partly by collecting a levy of US$3.12  (Yuan
25) per family and with a contribution from the Village Development Fund, to buy two new transformers, one for domestic connections and
the other for pumps. Since then, power losses have fallen to a permissible level of 12 percent here (Shah et al. 2004a).
14US$1.00 = Yuan 8.00 = Indian Rs 46.00 = Pakistan Rs 60.20 = Bangladeshi Taka 60.90 = Nepalese Rs 74.50 (July 2004).11
In India, pilot projects to find new metering
solutions have been started recently. Indian
Grameen Services, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), organized Transformer
User Associations in the Hoshangabad district
of Madhya Pradesh state to implement a plan
under which the SEB will set up a dedicated
power plant if farmers paid unpaid dues and
agreed to a metered tariff system. However,
before the 2004 elections, the Chief Minister
waived the unpaid dues of farmers and the
Hoshangabad associations disintegrated, its
members disillusioned. The state of Orissa
organized similar Village Electricity User
Associations (Vidyut Sanghas), in thousands,
under its reforms but these lie defunct now.
Orissa has achieved modest success in
improving metered charge collection by using
local entrepreneurs as billing and collection
agents. It is difficult to foresee if this would
work elsewhere because less than 5 percent
of the rural power load in Orissa is used for
agriculture. In Gujarat, where the agricultural
power consumption is 50 to 80 percent of the
total rural power consumption, it is difficult to
envisage what kind of treatment collection
agents would receive from farmers. Though it
is too early to learn lessons from these, it is
all too clear that the old system of metering
and billing, in which SEBs employed an army
of unionized meter readers, would just not
work.
15 That model seems passé; for electric
power as well as surface water, unit or
volumetric pricing can work, where needed,
only through smartly designed incentive
contracts.
From a Degenerate Flat Tariff to a Rational Flat Tariff
A flat tariff system for pricing farm power is
generally written off as inefficient, wasteful,
irrational and distortionary, besides being
inequitable. In the South Asian experience, it
has indeed proved to be so. It was the change
to a flat tariff system that encouraged political
leaders to indulge in populist whims such as
doing away with the farm power tariff altogether
(as Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and more
recently, Maharashtra have done) or pegging it
at unviably low levels, regardless of the true
cost of the power supply. Such actions have led
to the general perception that the flat tariff
regime has been responsible for ruining the
electricity industry and causing groundwater
depletion in many parts of South Asia.
However, we would like to suggest that the
flat tariff regime is wrongly maligned. In fact, the
flat tariff system that South Asia has used in its
energy-irrigation nexus so far is a completely
degenerate version of what could have been a
highly rational, sophisticated and scientific
pricing regime. Zero tariff, we submit, is certainly
not a rational flat tariff, nor is a flat tariff without
proactive rationing and supply management.
Pros and Cons of Flat Tariff
To most people, the worst thing about flat tariff
is that it violates the marginal cost principle that
advocates parity between the price charged and
the marginal cost of supply. Yet, businesses
commonly price their products or services in
ways that violate the marginal cost principle but
makes overall business sense. Flat rates are
often charged to stimulate use to justify the
incremental cost of providing a service. In the
early days of rural electrification, power utilities
used to charge a flat-cum-pro-rata tariff to
induce each tubewell owner to use at least the
amount of power that would justify its investment
in laying the power lines; the flat component of
15A 1997 consumer survey of the power sector in India revealed that: 53 percent of consumers had to pay bribes to electricity staff for ser-
vices supposed to be free; 68 percent suggested that grievance redress is poor or worse than poor; 76 percent found staff attitudes to be
poor or worse; 53 percent found repair of fault services to be poor or worse; 42 percent said they had to make 6 to 12 calls just to register a
complaint; 57 percent knew of power thefts in their neighborhoods; 35 percent complained of excess billing; and 76 percent complained of
inconvenience in paying their bills (Rao 2002).12
the tariff encouraged users to achieve this level.
India’s telephone department still charges the
first 250 calls in every billing cycle at a flat rate
even though all calls are metered; the idea here
is to encourage the use of the telephone service
to a level that justifies the incremental cost of
providing the service.
In general, however, a flat tariff regime is
commonly resorted to when saving on the
transaction costs of doing business is an
important business objective. Organizations hire
employees on a piece rate when their work
output is easy to measure. But flat rate
compensation is popular worldwide because it is
not easy to measure the marginal value of the
output of an employee on a daily basis.  Urban
public transport systems offer passes to
commuters at attractive flat rates in part
because commuters offer a stable business but
equally because it reduces queues at ticket
windows and the cost of ticketing and collecting
fares daily.  Cable television operators in India
still charge a flat tariff for a group of television
channels rather than charging for each channel
separately because the latter would substantially
increase their transaction costs. The Indian
Income Tax Department a few years ago offered
all businesses in the informal sector a flat
income tax of US$30.44 per year, instead of
launching a nationwide campaign to bring these
millions of small businesses within its tax net,
because the transaction costs of doing that
would have been far greater than the revenue
realized. A major reason municipal taxes are
levied on a flat rate is the high transaction cost
of charging citizens according to the marginal
value they place on municipal services.
Flat Tariff with Supply Management
Are all the businesses that charge for their
products or services on a flat rate destined to
make losses? No, often they make money
because they charge a flat rate. Many private
goods share with public goods, like municipal
services and defense, the feature of high
transaction costs of charging a differential price
to different customers based on their use as well
as the value they place on the product or
service. So they recover their costs through flat
rate charges and then remain viable through deft
supply management. Canal irrigation is a classic
example.
For ages we have been hearing about the
exhortations to charge irrigators on a volumetric
basis. However, nowhere in South Asia can we
find volumetric water pricing practiced in canal
irrigation. In our view, the transaction costs of
collecting volumetric charges for canal irrigation
become prohibitively high (Perry 1996; Perry
2001) because:
• In a typical South Asian system, the
number of customers involved per
1,000 ha of command is quite large; so
the cost of monitoring and measuring
water use by each user would be high.
• Once a gravity flow system is
commissioned, it becomes extremely
difficult in practice for the system
managers to exclude defaulting
customers of the command area from
availing themselves of irrigation when
others are.
• The customer propensity to frustrate the
seller’s effort to collect a charge based
on use would depend in some ways on
the magnitude of the charge as a
proportion the customer’s overall income.
Volumetric pricing of canal irrigation would
be far easier in irrigation systems serving a
small number of farmers. An example is South
African irrigation systems where a branch canal
may serve some 5,000 ha owned by 10 to 50
white commercial farmers. Charging them for
irrigation based on actual use would be easier
than in an Indian system where the same
command area would have 6 to 8 thousand
customers (Shah et al. 2002). The only way of
making canal irrigation systems viable in the
Indian situation is to raise the flat rate per
hectare irrigated to a level that ensures the
overall viability of the systems.
Supply restriction is inherent to rational flat
rate pricing; by the same token, flat rate pricing
is incompatible with on-demand service in most
situations. In that sense, consumption linked
pricing and flat rate pricing represent two
different business philosophies. In the first, the
supplier will strive to satisfy the customer by13
providing an on-demand service without quantity
or quality restrictions of any kind. In the latter,
the customer has to adapt to the supplier’s
constraints in terms of the overall quantum
available and the manner in which it is supplied.
Intelligent Management of Rationed
Power
The reason why the flat rate tariff for power
supply to agriculture, as currently practiced in
South Asia, is degenerate—and the power
industry is in the red—is because the power
utilities have failed to invest more intelligence in
managing a rationed power supply. In India,
under the flat tariff system until now, most SEBs
have tried to maintain the duration of the farm
power supply at 8-15 hours per day right through
the year. Raising the flat tariff to a level that
covers the cost of present levels of supply would
make it so high that it will send state
governments tumbling in the face of farmer
wrath.
16
However, we believe that it is possible for
power utilities to satisfy farmer needs while
reducing the total power supply to farmers
during a year by fine-tuning the scheduling of
power supply to the irrigation needs of farmers.
Ideally, the business objective of a power utility
charging a flat tariff should be to supply the best
quality service it can offer to its customers
consistent with the flat tariff pegged at a given
level. The big opportunity for “value
improvement” in the energy-irrigation nexus—
and by “value improvement” we mean “the ability
to meet or exceed customer expectations while
removing unnecessary cost” (Berk and Berk
1995)—arises from the fact that the pattern of
power demand of the farming sector differs in
significant ways from the demand pattern of
domestic and industrial sectors. For the
domestic consumer, a good quality service is
power of uniform voltage and frequency supplied
24 hours per day, 365 days of the year. But for
the irrigators a good quality service from power
utilities is power of uniform voltage and
frequency when their crops face critical moisture
stress. We argue that, with intelligent
management of the power supply, it is possible
to satisfy the irrigation power demand by
ensuring a supply of 18-20 hours a day for 40-
50 key moisture-stress days in the kharif and
rabi seasons of the year, with some power
available on other days. Against this, Tamilnadu
supplies power to farmers 14 hours per day for
365 days of the year! This is equivalent to
supplying the command area of an irrigation
system with all branches and the distribution
network operating at Full Supply Level, every
day of the year.
Groundwater irrigators are always envious of
farmers in command areas of canal irrigation
projects. But in some of the best irrigation
projects in South Asia, a typical canal irrigator
gets surface water for no more than 10-15 times
in a year. In most irrigation systems, in fact, he
would be happy if he gets water 6 times in a
year. An example is the new Sardar Sarovar
project in Gujarat, India. The Sardar Sarovar
dam is built on the Narmada river. In this
project, the policy is to provide farmers a total of
53 cm water in 5-6 installments during a full
year. To supply this depth of water, an irrigation
well with a modest output of 25 m
3 per hour
would pump for 212 hours for each hectare. In
terms of water availability, a pump owner with 3
ha of irrigable land would be at par with a
farmer with 3 ha in the Narmada command if he
gets 636 hours of power in a year. He would be
better off if the 636 hours of power comes when
he needs the water most. When the Gujarat
government commits to a year-round farm power
supply of 8 hours per day, it in effect offers
tubewell owners water entitlements 14 times
larger than the water entitlements that the
16In Madhya Pradesh, the Chief Minister announced a six-fold hike in the flat tariff in 2002. No sooner was the announcement made, there
was a realignment of forces within the ruling party and the most senior cabinet ministers began clamoring for a leadership change. Subhash
Yadav, the Deputy Chief Minister, lamented in an interview with India Today, “A farmer who produces 10 tons of wheat earns Rs 60,000
(US$1,304.35) and he is expected to pay Rs 55,000 (US$1,195.65) to the electricity board. What will he feed his children with and why
should he vote for the Congress?” (India Today 2002.32). The farmers stopped paying the revised flat rate charges in protest, and just before
the May 2004 assembly elections, the Chief Minister announced a waiver of all past electricity dues. Yet, he could not save his seat. His
Congress government, until now eulogized for a progressive development-oriented stance, was trounced at the polls. Analysts attributed his
defeat to the government’s failure on three fronts, Bijli, Pani, Sadak (electricity, irrigation, roads).14
Sardar Sarovar project offers to farmers in its
command area.
17 Under a metered tariff system,
this may not matter all that much since tubewell
owners would use power and groundwater only
when their value exceeds the marginal cost of
pumping. But under a flat tariff system, they
would have a strong incentive to use some of
these “excess water entitlements” for low
marginal value uses just because it costs them
little on the margin to pump groundwater. This is
why the present flat tariff in South Asia is
degenerate.
A rational flat tariff regime, if well managed,
can confer two large benefits. First, it may curtail
wasteful use of groundwater. If the farm power
supply outside main irrigation seasons is
restricted to 2-3 hours per day, it will encourage
farmers to build small on-farm storage tanks to
store water for multiple uses. Using a
progressive flat tariff—charging higher rates for
increasing horse power of pumps—will produce
additional incentives for farmers to purchase and
use smaller capacity pumps to irrigate less
areas and thereby reduce overdraft in regions
where resource depletion is rampant. Above all,
a restricted but predictable water supply will
encourage water-saving irrigation methods more
effectively than raising the marginal cost of
irrigation. Second, given the quality of power
transmission and distribution infrastructure in
rural India, restricting the period of time when
the farm power system is “on” may by itself
result in significant reductions in technical and
commercial losses of power. The parallel with
water supply systems is clear here. For
example, Briscoe (1999) wrote that throughout
the Indian subcontinent, the proportion of
unaccounted-for water in the supply is so high
that losses are “controlled” by having water in
the distribution system only a couple of hours a
day, and by keeping the water pressure very
low. In Madras, for example, it is estimated that
if the water supply to the city was to increase
from current levels (of about 2 hours of supply a
day at 2-meter pressure) to a reasonable level
(say 12 hours a day at 10-meter pressure) leaks
would account for a loss of about 900 million
liters per day, which is about three times the
current supply to the city! Much the same logic
works in farm power, with the additional caveat
that the T&D system of farm power connections
is far more widespread than the urban water
supply system.
Five Preconditions for Successful
Rationing
We believe that transforming the present
degenerate flat power tariff system into a rational
tariff regime will be easier, and more feasible and
beneficial in the short run in many parts of South
Asia, than trying to overcome farmer resistance
to metering. We also believe that doing so can
significantly cut the losses of power utilities from
their agricultural operation. There are five
preconditions, which seem important and feasible,
for achieving these objectives.
1. Separation of agricultural and nonagricultural
power supplies
The first precondition for successful rationing is
infrastructural changes needed to separate the
agricultural power supply from the
nonagricultural power supply to rural
settlements. The most common way this is
done now is to keep 2-phase power on for 24
hours so that domestic and (most)
nonagricultural uses are not affected and ration
the 3-phase power necessary to run irrigation
pumps. This is working, but only partially.
In India, the farmer response to rationed
3-phase power in states like Gujarat is
rampant use of phase-splitting capacitors
with which they can run pumps on even 2-
phase power. There are technological ways
to get around this. It is possible to use
gadgets that ensure that the 11 kV line shuts
off as soon as the load increases beyond a
predetermined level. However, many SEBs
have begun separating the feeders supplying
farm and non-farm rural consumers. The
government of Gujarat has now embarked
on an ambitious program (called Jyotirgram
Yojana) to lay parallel power supply lines for
agricultural users in 16,000 villages of the
state over the next three years at an
17At a rate of 25 m
3 per hour, a tubewell can pump 73,000 m
3 of water if it is operated whenever the power supply is on. At the water entitle-
ment of 5,300 m
3 per hectare prescribed in the Sardar Sarovar project, this volume of water can irrigate 13.77 ha of land.15
estimated cost of US$195.7 million. In
Andhra Pradesh, the process of separation
of domestic and agricultural feeders is
already 70 percent complete (Raghu 2004).
This would ensure that industrial users in the
rural areas who need an uninterrupted 3-
phase power supply as well as domestic
users remain unaffected by the rationing of
power supplies to agricultural consumers.
Another infrastructural change needed
would be to install meters to monitor power
use so that proper power budgeting can be
implemented. For this, meters at transformer
level or even feeder levels might be
appropriate. Many states have already
installed meters at feeder level.
2. Gradual and regular increases in flat tariff
for power
Flat tariffs have a tendency to be
unchangeable. In most Indian states, flat
tariffs for power have not changed for over
10-15 years while the cost of generating and
distributing power has soared. Raising the
flat tariff at once to close this gap between
revenue and cost per kWh would be too
drastic an increase. However, we believe
that farmers would be able to cope with a
regular 10-15 percent annual increase in flat
tariff far more easily than a 350 percent
increase as has been proposed by the
Electricity Regulatory Commission in Gujarat.
3. An explicit subsidy
If we are to judge the value of a subsidy to
a large mass of people by the scale of
popular opposition in India to curtailing it,
there is little doubt that, among the plethora
of subsidies that state governments in India
provide, the power subsidy is one of the most
valued. Indeed, any decision by a ruling party
to curtail the power subsidy is the biggest
weapon that opposition parties will use to
bring down the government. So it is unlikely
that political leaders will want to do away with
power subsidies completely, no matter what
the power industry and international donors
would like and recommend. However, the
problem with the power subsidy in the
current, degenerate flat tariff system is its
indeterminacy. Chief Ministers of Indian states
keep issuing diktats to SEBs about the
number of hours of power per day to be
supplied to farmers. That done, the actual
subsidy availed of by the farmers is in effect
left to them to usurp. Instead, the
governments should tell the power utility the
amount of power subsidy it can make
available at the start of each year; and the
power utility should then decide the amount
of energy the flat tariff and the government
subsidy can buy for agricultural use.
4. Use of off-peak power
In estimating losses from the farm power
supply, protagonists of power sector reform,
including international agencies,
systematically overestimate the real
opportunity cost of power supplied to the
farmers. For instance, the cost of supplying
power to the domestic sector—including
generation, transmission and distribution—is
often taken as the opportunity cost of power
to agriculture, which is clearly wrong since a
large part of the high transaction costs of
distributing power to the domestic sector is
saved in supplying power to agriculture
under a flat tariff system.  Moreover, a large
part of the power supplied to the farm sector
is off-peak load power. In fact, but for the
agriculture sector, power utilities would be
hard-pressed to dispose of this power.
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Over half of the power supply to the farm
sector is in the night, and this proportion can
increase further. But in computing the
amount of power the prevailing flat tariff and
pre-specified subsidy can buy, the power
utilities must use the lower opportunity cost
of the off-peak supply.
18The cost of the power supply has three components: energy cost, fixed generation cost and T&D cost. The first two account for about 60-80
percent of the total cost of supplying power. The energy cost, which is variable, depends on the length of time of power consumption but the
fixed generation cost depends on how much a consumer consumes at peak load. The T&D cost depends on where the consumer is connected
in the system. Since the contribution of agricultural power consumption to peak load is often very little, the opportunity cost of the power supply
to agriculture is lower than the overall average cost of the supply. Moreover, agricultural consumption, most of it off-peak, helps smoothen the
load curve for the whole system and saves on the back-up cost, which is high for coal-based plants and insignificant for hydropower plants.16
FIGURE 3.
Duration of power supply and duration of operation of electric and diesel pumps.
Note: This is a schematic diagram. The numbers shown are indicative and not based on actual field data.
5. Intelligent supply management
There is tremendous scope for cutting costs
and improving the service through supply
management (figure 3). In India, the existing
policy in many states of maintaining a
constant power supply to the farm sector
during pre-specified hours, according to a
roster, is irrational and is the prime reason
for the wasteful use of power and water.
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Ideally, the power supply to the farm sector
should be so scheduled as to reflect the
pumping behavior of a modal group of
farmers in a given region where they would
be subject to metered power tariff at full
cost. However, it is difficult to simulate this
behavior because farmers everywhere are
charged under a flat tariff system under
which they would have a propensity to use
power whenever it is available, regardless of
its marginal product. In many Indian states,
there is a small number of new tubewells
whose owners pay for power on a metered
basis. However, they are charged so low a
rate that they behave pretty much like flat-
tariff paying farmers. By comparing the
electricity use before and after flat tariff, the
extent of overutilization of power and water
attributable to flat tariff could be gauged.
20
19In Tamilnadu, where the farm power supply is free, 14 hours of 3-phase power, 6 hours during day and 8 hours during night, is supplied
throughout the year. In Andhra Pradesh, 9 hours of 3-phase power supply is guaranteed, 6 hours during the day and 3 hours during the night
(Palanisami and Kumar 2002); this was recently reduced to 7 hours when the new government began providing power free. This implies that
in theory, a tubewell in Tamilnadu can run for over 5,000 hours in a year; and in Andhra Pradesh, it can run for 3,200 hours. If the real cost of
power is taken as US cents 5.4 per kWh, depending upon how conscientious he is, a Tamilnadu farmer operating a 10 hp tubewell can avail
himself of a power subsidy as high as US$2,038 (Indian Rs 93,750) per year, and an Andhra farmer, US$1,304 (Indian Rs 60,000) per year.
Reports that farmers use automatic switches to turn on the tubewells whenever the power supply starts suggest that many farmers are going
to extremes in using power and water. Palanisami and Kumar (2002) mention the use of such automatic switches by farmers who own bore-
wells, to lift water during the night to fill an open well; during the day, they pump the water from the open well to irrigate their fields! They
would not indulge in such waste if they had to pay a metered charge of US cents 5.4 per kWh and they would also not do this if they got only
3-4 hours of good quality power during convenient hours on a pre-announced schedule.
20An extreme case is Tamilnadu, where electricity consumption per tubewell shot up from 2,583 kWh per year under a metered tariff system
in the early 1980s to 4,546 kWh per year during 1997-98. However, this jump represents 3 components: (a) increased consumption due to
the degenerate flat tariff; (b) increased consumption because of the increased average lift caused by resource depletion; and (c) T&D losses
in other segments that are wrongly assigned to agriculture. Palanisami (2001) estimated that 32 percent of the increased power use was
explained by additional pumping, and 68 percent by increased lift. However, he made no effort to estimate the T&D losses, which we suspect
are quite large.17
However, our surmise is that the
pumping behavior of diesel pump owners,
who are subject to the full marginal cost of
energy comparable to what electric
tubewell owners would pay under an
unsubsidized metered tariff regime, would
provide a good indicator of the temporal
pattern of power use by electric tubewells
under a metered tariff regime. Several
studies have shown that the annual
duration of operation of diesel tubewells is
often half or less compared to electric
tubewells using flat-tariff power (Mukherji
and Shah 2002).
21 Batra and Singh (2003)
interviewed some 188 farmers in Indian
Punjab, Haryana and Central Uttar
Pradesh to explore whether the pumping
behavior of diesel and electric pump
owners differed significantly. They did not
find significant differences in Indian Punjab
and Haryana
22 but their results for central
Uttar Pradesh suggest that diesel pumps
are used when irrigation is needed and
electric pumps are operated whenever
electricity is available. Very likely, a good
deal of the excess water pumped by
farmers owning both electric and diesel
pumps is wasted in the sense that its
marginal value product falls short of the
scarcity value of water and power together.
Figures 4 and 5 present the central
premise of our case: a large part of the
excess of pumping by electric tubewells over
diesel tubewells is indicative of the waste of
21We recognize that comparing the duration of operation of diesel and electric tubewells is not the same as comparing the quantity of water
extracted. However, in understanding the economic behavior of tubewell owners, we believe that comparing the duration of operation is more
meaningful than comparing the quantity of water extracted. In any case, for the same duration of pumping, an electric pump would produce
more water per horsepower compared to a diesel pump ceteris paribus due to the higher efficiency of the electric pump.
22Indian Punjab and Haryana have a much more productive agriculture  compared to other parts of India with the cost of irrigation being just
8-10 percent of the gross value of produce. That might explain why the pumping pattern is inelastic to the energy cost. However, this is just a
hypothesis and needs to be further examined.
FIGURE 4.
Duration of operation (hours per year) of electric (flat tariff) and diesel pumps: India and Bangladesh, 2002.18
water and power that is encouraged by the
zero marginal cost of pumping under the
present degenerate flat tariff regime.  Figure
4 presents results of a survey of 2,234
tubewell irrigators across India and
Bangladesh in late 2002. It shows that
electric tubewell owners subject to flat tariff
everywhere in the survey area invariably
operate their pumps for a much longer
duration compared to diesel pump owners
who face a steep marginal energy cost of
pumping (Mukherji and Shah 2002). It might
be argued that the duration is less because
FIGURE 5.
Duration of pump operation weighted by horsepower rating of electric (flat tariff) and diesel pumps: India and
Bangladesh, 2002.
diesel pumps, on average, might be bigger in
capacity compared to electric pumps. So we
also compared the duration of pumping
weighted by the horsepower rating of the
pump, and figure 5 shows that the number of
horsepower-hours of use of electric pumps
under flat tariff too are significantly higher
than that for diesel pumps everywhere in the
area of survey by  40 to 150 percent. Some
of this excess pumping no doubt results in
additional output; however, a good deal of it
very likely does not, and is a social waste
that needs to be eliminated.19
Making Rational Flat Tariff and Intelligent Power Supply
Management Work
If power utilities undertake a refined analysis of
the level and pattern of pumping by diesel pump
owners in a region, and shave off the potential
excess pumping by flat-tariff paying electric
tubewell owners (as shown in figure 3) by fine-
tuning the power supply schedule around the
year, flat tariff can not only become viable but
also socially optimal by eliminating “waste.”
In India, the average number of hours for
which diesel pumps operate is between 500 and
600 per year. At 600 hours of annual operation,
an electric tubewell would use about 450 kWh of
power per horsepower of the pump. If all the
power used is off-peak load, discounted at 25
percent of a generation cost of US cents 5.43
per kWh, the power utility supplying farm power
would break even at a flat tariff of US$18.34 per
horsepower per year. The flat tariff rate in force
in Gujarat since 1989 is US$10.87 (Indian Rs
500) per horsepower per year. The Gujarat state
government is committed to raise the flat tariff
eventually to around US$45.65 (Indian Rs 2,100)
per horsepower per year at the instance of the
Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission.
However, chances are that if it does so, farmers
will unseat the government. A more viable and
practical course would be to raise the flat tariff in
stages to about US$26.00 (Indian Rs 1,200) and
restrict the annual supply of farm power to 1,000
to 1,200 hours against the 3,000 to 3,500 hours
of power per year provided now.  A 5-hp pump
lifting 25 m
3 of water per hour over a head of 15
meters can extract 30,000 m
3 of water per year
in 1,200 hours of tubewell operation, sufficient to
meet the needs of most small farmers in the
region.
Farmers will no doubt resist such rationing of
the power supply; however, their resistance can
be reduced through proactive and intelligent
supply management by:
1. Enhancing the predictability and certainty of
the supply: More than the total quantum of
power delivered, in our assessment, the power
supplier can help farmers by announcing an
annual schedule of power supply finely tuned
to match the demand pattern of farmers. Once
announced, the utility must stick to the
schedule so that farmers can be certain about
power availability.
2. Improving the quality of the power supply:
Whenever power is supplied, it should be at
the specified, standard voltage and frequency,
minimizing damage to motors and downtime
of transformers due to voltage fluctuation and
unstable frequency.
3. Better matching of supply to peak periods of
moisture stress: Most canal irrigators in South
Asia manage with only 3 to 4 canal water
releases in a season. There are probably 2
weeks during kharif and 5 weeks during rabi
in a normal year when the average South
Asian irrigation farmer experiences great
nervousness about moisture stress to his
crops. If the power utility can take care of
these periods, 80-90 percent of the farmers’
power and water needs would be met. This
will, however, not help sugarcane growers of
the Indian states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and
Tamilnadu who are a big part of the power
utility’s problems in these Indian states.
4. Better upkeep of the farm power supply
infrastructure: Intelligent power supply
management to agriculture is a tricky
business. If power rationing is done through
arbitrary power cuts and the rural power
infrastructure is neglected, there could be
disastrous consequences. Eastern India is a
classic example. After the eastern Indian
states switched to a flat power tariff, they
found it difficult to maintain the viability of
power utilities in the face of organized
opposition to raising the flat tariff from militant
farmer leaders like Mahendra Singh Tikait. As
a result, the power utilities began to neglect
the maintenance and repair of the power
infrastructure and the rural power supply was
reduced to a trickle. Unable to irrigate their
crops, farmers began en masse to replace
electric pumps with diesel pumps. Over a
decade, the groundwater economy got more
or less completely dieselized in large regions,
including Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh, and
north Bengal. As figure 6 shows, electric20
pumps dominate groundwater irrigation in the
western parts of India while diesel pumps are
preponderant in the east. In these
groundwater abundant eastern regions of
India, small diesel pumps, though dirtier and
costlier to operate, kept the agricultural
economy going. But in regions like north
Gujarat, where groundwater is lifted from
depths of 200-300 meters, such de-
electrification can completely destroy the
agricultural economy.
A major advantage the rational flat tariff
regime offers is in putting a brake on
groundwater depletion in western and peninsular
India. Growing evidence suggests that the water
demand in agriculture is inelastic, within a large
range, to the cost of pumping water. While a
metered charge system without subsidy can
make power utilities viable, it may not help much
to cut water use and encourage water saving in
agriculture. If anything, a growing body of
evidence suggests that water and power saving
methods respond more strongly to the scarcity
of these resources than to their price. Pockets
of India where drip irrigation is spreading
rapidly—such as the Aurangabad region in
Maharashtra, Maikaal region in Madhya Pradesh,
Kolar in Karnataka, and Coimbatore in
Tamilnadu—are all areas where water or power
is scarce rather than costly. A rational flat tariff
system with intelligent power supply rationing to
the farm sector holds out the promise of
minimizing wasteful use of water and power and
encouraging technical change towards water and
power saving.  Our surmise is that such a
strategy could easily reduce the annual
groundwater extraction in western and peninsular
India by 12-21 km
3 per year and reduce energy
use in groundwater extraction by 4-6 billion kWh
per year, valued at US$220-330 million.
FIGURE 6.
Distribution of electric pumps, as percentage of total pumps used for groundwater extraction, in India, 1993-94.
Note: Data for Gujarat, Karnataka and Tamilnadu are based on the Minor Irrigation Census of 1986, as these states were not included in the
1993-94 Minor Irrigation Census, which is the basis of the data for the other states.21
Approaches to Rationing
Improving the Current System
The strongest piece of evidence in support of
our argument for “intelligent” rationing of the
farm power supply as the way to improve
groundwater conservation and power sector
viability is the experience of State Electricity
Boards (SEBs) in India. Most SEBs have
followed some kind of rationing of the farm
power supply for over a decade. Andhra
Pradesh, where the new state government
announced free power to farmers in June 2004,
has now decided that the farm power supply
would henceforth be restricted to 7 hours per
day.  Nobody, including farmers, consider a
24-hour, uninterrupted power supply to
agriculture to be either a feasible proposition or
a defensible demand under the flat tariff regime
in force. Negotiations between farmer groups
and state governments almost everywhere in
India are carried out in terms of the minimum
hours of daily power supply the government can
guarantee.
A power supply of constant duration per
day to farmers, which is the current norm, is
the least intelligent way of rationing power to
agriculture because it fails to achieve a good
“fit” between the schedule of power supply and
farmers’ desired irrigation schedule. It leaves
farmers frustrated on days when their crops
need to be watered the most and, on many
other days when the need for irrigation is not
high, it leads to wasteful use of power and
groundwater. From where the present power
rationing practices of SEBs stand today, they
only have to improve by achieving a better fit
between power supply schedules and farmers’
irrigation schedules. Farmers keep demanding
that the “constant hours per day” must be
increased because the present system does not
provide enough power when they need it most.
Illustrative Approaches
The rationing of the power supply to agriculture,
while raising farmer satisfaction and controlling
power subsidies, can be carried out in ways that
reduce farmers’ uncertainty about the timing of
power availability or achieve a better fit between
power supply schedules and irrigation schedules,
or both. We suggest a few illustrative approaches
that need to be considered and tried out.
Agronomic Scheduling
Ideally, power utilities should aim to achieve the
“best fit” by matching power supply schedules
with irrigation needs of farmers. In this approach
to rationing, the power utility: (i) constantly
studies the irrigation behavior of farmers in
regions and subregions by monitoring cropping
patterns, cropping cycles and rainfall events; (ii)
matches power supply schedules to meet
irrigation needs; and (iii) minimizes supply in off-
peak irrigation periods (figure 7). The
advantages of such a system are: (i) farmers
are happier; (ii) the total power supplied to
agriculture can be reduced; (iii) power and water
waste is minimized; and (iv) the level of subsidy
to farmers is within the control of the power
utility. The key disadvantage of this approach is
that it is highly management intensive and,
therefore, difficult to operationalize.
Demand-based Scheduling
In this approach, feeder-level farmer committees
or other representational bodies of farmers
assume the responsibility of ascertaining
member requirements of power, and provide a
power supply schedule to the utility for a fixed
number of allowable hours for each season. This
is a modified version of agronomic scheduling in
which the power utility’s research and monitoring
task is assumed by feeder committees. This
may make it easier to generate demand
schedules but may make it more difficult to
serve the power according to the schedules.
Moreover, the organizational challenge this
approach poses is formidable.
Canal-based Scheduling
Tubewell irrigators outside canal commands
justify their demands for power subsidies by
comparing their lot with canal irrigators who get
cheap canal irrigation without any capital22
investments of their own. However, under the
present, degenerate flat tariff system, tubewell
irrigators often have the best of both the worlds.
For example, in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh, at 10 hours of power supply per day, a
tubewell irrigator could in theory use 300-500 m
3
of water every day of the year. In contrast,
under some of the best canal commands,
farmers get irrigation only for 10-15 times in an
entire year. In this approach, power rationing
aims to remove the inequity between tubewell
and canal irrigators by scheduling the power
supply to mimic the irrigation schedule of a
benchmark public irrigation system. This can
drastically reduce power subsidies from current
levels, but for that very same reason, will face
stiff resistance from tubewell irrigators.
Zonal Roster
An approach to rationing that is simpler to
administer is to divide the area covered by a
power utility into zones, say 7 zones, each zone
assigned a fixed day of the week when it gets
20 hours of uninterrupted, quality power
throughout the year. On the rest of the days,
each zone gets 2 hours of power. This is
somewhat like a weekly turn in the warabandi
system of canal irrigation systems in Indian
Punjab and Pakistan Punjab. The advantages of
FIGURE 7.
Improving farmer satisfaction and controlling subsidies for electricity through intelligent management of the farm power supply.23
this approach are: (i) it is easy to administer; (ii)
the agricultural power load for the area as a
whole remains constant, and becomes easier to
manage for the power utility; (iii) the level of
subsidies is controlled; and (iv) the power supply
to each zone is predictable and so the farmers
can plan their irrigation easily. The
disadvantages are: (i) farmers in deep water-
table areas or areas with poor aquifers (for
example, Saurashtra in the Indian state of
Gujarat) would be unhappy; and (ii) zonal
rostering will not mimic seasonal fluctuations in
irrigation demand as well as agronomic rationing
would do.
Adjusted Zonal Roster
The zonal roster can help farmers plan their
cropping patterns and irrigation schedules by
reducing uncertainty in the power supply, but it
does not do much to improve the “fit” between
irrigation need and power supply across
seasons. In most of India, for instance, following
the same zonal roster for the kharif and rabi
seasons makes little sense. Modifying the zonal
roster system so that the power supply offered
is higher in winter and summer than in the
monsoon season would improve the seasonal fit
as well as reduce uncertainty.
Conclusion
We have reevaluated the entire debate on the
supply of power for groundwater irrigation in
South Asia. In examining the energy-irrigation
nexus, issues that are unique to South Asia and
the North China Plain came into focus. In India,
the biggest groundwater user in the world, either
a switch to a metered tariff regime at this
juncture or increasing the flat tariff fourfold, as
proposed in Gujarat, will very likely backfire in
most of the states. Metering is highly unlikely to
improve the fortunes of the power utilities, which
have found no smarter way of dealing with the
exceedingly high transaction costs of a metered
farm power supply that led them to a flat tariff
regime in the first place. However, if
agriculturally dynamic states like Punjab and
Haryana—where non-farm uses of 3-phase
power supply are extensive and growing in the
villages and where productive farmers can afford
the higher cost of a better quality power supply
in their stride— want to experiment with metered
power supply, they would be well-advised to
create micro-entrepreneurs to retail power, to
meter individual power consumption and collect
revenue rather than experiment with wooly
ideas of electricity cooperatives, which continue
to be promoted (Gulati and Narayanan
2003:129). Despite 50 years of effort to make
these cooperatives work, including provision of
donor support, they have not succeeded in
India. The 50-year old Pravara electricity
cooperative in Maharashtra survives but owes
the SEB several billions of Indian rupees in
unpaid dues (Godbole 2002).
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In promoting the metering of the farm power
supply, it should be borne in mind that the
largest component of the transaction costs of
metering, which is the most difficult to manage,
arises from measures taken to contain user
efforts to frustrate the metered tariff regime, by
pilfering power, making illegal connections,
tampering with meters, and so on. These costs
soar in a “soft state” in which an average user
expects to get away easily even if caught
indulging in malpractice.
24 One reason why
metering works reasonably well in China is
23Thus, Madhav Godbole notes, “But if co-operatives are to be a serious and viable option [for power distribution], our present thinking on the
subject will have to be seriously reassessed. As compared to the success stories of electricity co-operatives [in USA, Thailand and Bangladesh],
ours have been dismal failures” (Godbole 2002: 2197).
24The transaction costs of charge collection will be high even under a flat tariff regime if farmers think they can get away with cheating.
Throughout India and Pakistan, replacing nameplates of electric motors of tubewells has emerged as a “growth industry” under flat tariff.  In
the Indian state of Haryana, a World Bank study had recently estimated that the actual connected agricultural load was 74 percent higher
than what the official utility records showed (Kishore and Sharma 2002).24
because it is a “hard state;” an average user
fears the village electrician whose informal
power and authority border on the absolute in
his domain.
25 In the Indian state of Orissa,
ongoing experiments on the privatization of
electricity retailing will soon produce useful
lessons on whether metering-cum-billing agents
can drastically and sustainably reduce the cost
of metered power in a situation where tubewell
owners account for a significant proportion of the
electricity used.
However, with tight and intelligent supply
management, in the particular context of South
Asia, a rational flat tariff and intelligent power
supply management can achieve all that a
metered tariff regime can, and more. Flat tariff
will have to be raised, but the schema we have
set out can cut power utility losses from farm
power supply substantially. The total duration of
power supplied to farmers during a year will
have to be reduced but farmers would get good
quality power aplenty at times of moisture stress
when they need irrigation most. The power
supply to agriculture should be metered at the
feeder level so as to be able to measure and
monitor the use of power in irrigation in order to
manage it well.  In this way, the huge
transaction costs of metered charge collection
would be saved; and if power utilities were to
begin viewing farmers as customers, the
adversarial relationship between them could
even be turned into a benign one.
While a metered tariff regime will turn
groundwater markets into sellers’ markets, hitting
the resource-poor water buyers, a rational flat
tariff would help keep water markets as buyers’
markets, albeit far less so than would be the
case under the present degenerate flat tariffs
(for the detailed argument, see Shah 1993).
Rational flat tariff—under which power rationing
is far more defensible than under a metered
tariff regime—will make it possible to put an
effective check on the total use of power and
water and make their use more sustainable than
under the present regime or under a metered
tariff regime. Moreover, restricting the total
duration of operation of the farm power supply
would help greatly curtail technical and
commercial losses experienced by power utilities.
Above all, a rational flat tariff can significantly
curtail groundwater depletion by minimizing
wasteful resource use. Based on an IWMI survey
of 2,234 owners of diesel and electric tubewells in
India, Pakistan, the Terai region of Nepal and
Bangladesh, it was concluded that electric
tubewell owners subject to a flat tariff regime with
an unrestricted, poor-quality power supply worked
their pumps 40-150 percent more horsepower-
hours compared to diesel tubewell owners with
greater control over their irrigation schedules. A
rational flat tariff with planned irrigation schedules
can easily curtail groundwater draft by 13-14
million electric tubewells at least by 10-14
percent, that is, by 12-21 km
3 every year,
assuming that they pump a total of 120-150 km
3
of groundwater every year.
Contrary to popular understanding, a rational
flat tariff is an elegant and sophisticated regime,
managing which requires a complex set of skills
and deep understanding of agriculture and
irrigation in different regions. Power utilities in
South Asia have never had these skills or the
understanding, which is a major reason for the
constant hiatus between them and the
agriculture sector. One reason is that power
utilities employ only engineers (Rao 2002). In
the power sector reforms under way in many
Indian states, this important aspect has been
overlooked in the institutional architecture of
unbundling. In this region, distributing power to
agriculture is a different ball game from selling it
to town people and industry; and private
25Private electricity companies that supply power in Indian cities like Ahmedabad and Surat instill fear in their users by regularly meting out
exemplary penalties for misuse, often in an arbitrary manner. The Ahmedabad Electricity Company’s inspection squads, for example, are set
steep targets of penalty collection for pilferage. To meet these targets, they have to catch real or imagined power thieves; their victims cough
up the fine because going to courts would take years to redress their grievances while they stay without power. Although these horror stories
paint a sordid picture, the company would find it difficult to keep its commercial losses to acceptable levels unless its customers are repeat-
edly reminded about their obligation to pay for the power they use.25
distribution companies will most likely exclude
the agricultural market segment in a hurry as
being “too difficult and costly to serve,” as the
experience of the Indian state of Orissa is
already showing.
26 Perhaps, the most
appropriate course would be to promote a
separate distribution company to serve the
agriculture sector with specialized competence
and a skill base. Predetermined government
subsidies to the farming sector should be
directed to the agricultural power distribution
companies.
27
26The Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission opened the gates for power utilities to ask agriculture to fend for itself, when it decided that
“any expansion of the grid, which is not commercially viable would not be taken into account in calculating the capital base of the company.
In future unless government gives grants for rural electrification, the projects will not be taken up through tariff route” (Panda 2002).
27T. L. Sankar, for instance, has argued for the need to set up separate supply companies for farmers and the rural poor that will access
cheap power from hydroelectric and depreciated thermal plants; the power will be subsidized, as necessary, directly by governments (Rao
2002: 3435).2627
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